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Abstract
A binary choice model was used to identify the attributes that influence irrigation district
adoption of conservation rate structures. Using principles of rate design and irrigation district 
administration as a framework, measures of irrigation district rate structure objectives and
physical and economic conditions were developed. The factors investigated characterize the
constraints under which districts operate, value and cost of water, quantity of water delivered and
revenue risk for districts. Rate structure adoption was predicted with over 75% accuracy. Both
significant and non-significant factors are key to understanding rate choice. District’s were more
likely to adopt conservation rate pricing when the cost of water to farmers was greater, higher
value crops were grown and in areas with warmer and longer growing seasons. These conditions
may be interpreted as reflecting the presence of greater opportunity costs in allocating water
between low and higher valued uses. Conservation rate pricing was less likely to be adopted by
district’s where the proportion of alfalfa to total acreage was higher and with higher per acre
deliveries of water. Somewhat surprisingly, annual variation in water deliveries (which should
increase the risk of revenue shortfalls) and size of the district (larger districts being more
sophisticated) have little bearing on the type of rate structure adopted. 1
Irrigation District Adoption of Water Conserving Rate Structures 
In response to legislation and litigation to encourage efficient water use, conservation
policies for irrigation districts that receive water from U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (BOR)
projects have recently been implemented.  A central element of these policies is the
recommendation or requirement that rate structures with “conservation pricing” be adopted by
irrigation districts.  Conservation pricing is defined as a billing strategy that “is based, at least in
part, on the quantity of water delivered” and where the unit price of water is uniform or increasing
as the volume of water used increases (BOR 1996 p.7).  Responsibility for designing and
implementing conservation pricing is assigned to irrigation districts. However, irrigation districts
have a variety of objectives and constraints so that conservation based rate structures will not be
of interest to or appropriate for all districts.  Over half of the rate structures used by irrigation
districts supplied by Bureau of Reclamation water lack incentive to conserve and only 20%
percent of districts had a rate structure where the price per unit increases with the quantity of
water delivered (Michelsen et al. 1997).  To help implement their conservation pricing policy the
Bureau of Reclamation has produced two guidebooks (BOR 1996 and BOR 1997) and is
developing a program to assist districts in designing conservation oriented rate structures (BOR
1996, BOR 1997).  For this conservation pricing policy and implementation program to be
effective it is essential have an understanding of irrigation district objectives and conditions which
determine the adoption of their rate structures.  We have found no other published research on the
attributes influencing selection of and actual adoption of irrigation district rate structures. 
In this paper, a theoretical model of rate structure selection is formulated and empirically
tested.  Measures of irrigation district objectives and economic and physical conditions were
constructed using economic principles of rate design and irrigation district administration as a
framework.  An empirical data set of these measures was developed from an unpublished survey
of district rate structures and from a variety of other sources of information on water use, crop
production and revenue characteristics and climate conditions.  The rate structure selection model
was tested successfully and the factors that influence irrigation district adoption of rate structures
analyzed.  The results of this research will benefit and be used by district managers and Bureau of
Reclamation staff to strategically and efficiently target efforts in conservation rate structure design
and adoption. 2
Irrigation District Rate Structure Objectives
In terms of production technology, cost structure and demand, irrigation districts share
many of the characteristics of public utilities.  Irrigation districts typically have decreasing
production costs with increasing levels of output (natural monopolies), are capital intensive with
high, lumpy fixed costs (dams, pump and distribution systems), are the exclusive supplier with
territorial integrity, provide a good that is nonstoreable and nontransferable by the user (physical,
legal and institutional restrictions), and provide an essential service with inelastic demand
(adapted from Bonbright, et al. 1988; Phillips 1985).  Bonbright et al. (1988) lists eight criteria for
a sound or desirable rate structure.  They are: 
1.  Simplicity, understandability, public acceptability and feasibility of application.
2.  Freedom from controversies as to proper interpretation.
3.  Effectiveness in yielding total revenue requirements.
4.  Revenue stability from year to year.
5.  Stability of rates (minimum of unexpected changes).
6.  Fairness (equity) of the rates in apportionment of total costs among customers.
7.  Avoidance of undue discrimination in rate relationships.
8.  Efficiency of the rates in discouraging wasteful use while promoting all justified types and
amounts of use.
In a study of efficient water pricing, Brill, Hochmam and Zilberman (1998, p.953)
condense Bonbright’s eight criteria and assert that three management criteria are necessary for an
optimal pricing policy, efficient water allocation, balanced budget and equity distribution in
proportion to historical water use. 
Whereas irrigation district’s share many cost, production and demand characteristics with
public utilities, district internal management and external regulatory environment departs from
public utilities. Public utilities are publicly or shareholder owned and government regulated.
Irrigation districts are farmer owned, non-profit organizations whose cost-sharing arrangements
are characterized as equity-constrained welfare maximization (Aadland and Koplin).  Irrigation
districts are organized and operate as agricultural cooperatives (Rosen and Sexton).  Agricultural
cooperatives are formed to take advantage of economies of scale in marketing agricultural
products or supplying agricultural inputs (chemicals, seed etc.) and irrigation water. Four
principles define the operation of a cooperative (Vitaliano):
• service at cost,
• benefits in proportion to use,
• member farmer control, and3
• limited returns to equity capital.
Non-profit farmer administered cooperatives have some additional and different rate
design criteria than public utilities.  The service at cost principle is a reflection of non-profit
cooperative organizational principles and legal and contractual water allocation and repayment
obligations.  Irrigation district costs include Bureau of Reclamation water supply service and
repayment contracts and construction, operation and management of district water delivery
facilities. The water supply costs assessed by the Bureau of Reclamation are based on federal
project construction, operation and maintenance costs, net of subsidies.  These costs are largely
fixed, with the exception of water lift energy costs.  Distribution facilities are a large part of
district costs, and these are also fixed or invariant to the quantity of water delivered to a single
location. District pricing of water reflects this arrangement where a fixed assessment is charged
per acre of irrigated land or share in the district to cover service costs.  Fixed assessments satisfy
the service at cost principle and also many of the desirable criteria for a rate structure. 
Legal, institutional and physical restrictions limit the ability or incentive for the Bureau of
Reclamation, irrigation districts or water users to consider other costs.  Water allocations are
based on legal water rights and established water duties (amount of water per acre of land
determined as necessary for that use).  The nonprofit constraint on equity capital return directly
contrasts to public utilities.  Whereas public utility rates are set to provide a return to the large
capital costs and that return is highly regulated, irrigation district assessments are set by the water
users to exactly cover service  costs.
Farmers within a district receive benefits not as stockholders nor even board members of
the district but as water users. Thus benefits accrue to the district member in proportion to use.
Member-user control is also vested in members as users, not as owners. Irrigation districts are not
one-person one vote democracies, rather political power is wielded in proportion to water use.
However, “proportional voting does not imply less control over a cooperative by member-users
than under [one-person one-vote systems] but rather a redistribution of voting power with
emphasis on use of the organization instead of mere membership...” (Vitaliano p147).  We thus
witness in irrigation districts at the urban fringe an annual hookup charge targeted at “gentleman
farmers” to spread annual fixed costs to smaller water users. 
Difficulties in efficient pricing of decreasing production cost goods have long been
recognized. A utility’s characteristic production technology of lower costs with increasing levels4
of output will result in a budget deficit for the district when strict efficiency pricing (the price of
water to farmers is priced at the marginal cost of providing that water.  Revenues with marginal
cost pricing will not cover costs of an increasing returns to scale utility.  Hotelling argued that
efficient pricing should be marginal cost pricing and that the deficit in decreasing cost industries
should be financed by a lump sum tax. Ruggles introduced welfare or allocative implications into
marginal cost pricing arguments with key objections introduced by Vickery and Wiseman in the
selection of investment alternatives, income distribution distortion effects and the equity
judgements in marginal cost pricing. Bonbright was critical of public utility pricing to achieve
social objectives and was concerned with workable principles so that “public utility services are
designed to be sold at cost, or at cost plus a fair profit” (Bonbright 1988, p.23).  Sexton
advocates the efficient price for cooperatives be a user charge based upon marginal cost and a
fixed fee (such as an assessment on land in the district under irrigation) set to cover the break-
even cost.  A multipart pricing structure (fixed charge plus marginal price per unit) satisfies cost
recovery requirements and achieves the efficiency of marginal cost pricing, but provides limited
incentive to conserve.  Average cost pricing per unit of water could satisfy a districts’ cost
recovery requirements and provide some incentive to conserve, but because of variability in
supply while costs remain largely fixed, average cost pricing increases revenue stability risk and
does not meet rate structure efficiency criteria.  Problems in designing district rate structures that
satisfy cost of service and efficiency criteria are compounded by legal or institutional conditions
that specify water allocation quantities independent of costs.  Declining marginal supply costs,
legally established water allocations, high fixed costs, desire for revenue stability, simplicity, cost
of service principles and cost recovery requirements has lead many irrigation districts to adopt
rate structures classified as non conservation oriented.
Conservation rate structures assume that water supply or opportunity costs are uniform or
increasing. As discussed above, this is not the case with many irrigation districts.  Opportunities
for economic gain from reallocation efficiency of water are often limited because of legal,
institutional, equity or physical constraints.  When opportunity costs can be realized, irrigation
districts (their member users) will have incentive to adopt increasing cost or conservation oriented
rate structures in terms of economic efficiency.  Although efficiency is typically the focus of
economic studies, it is one of a several different rate structure objectives. A model and measures
of rate structure adoption are developed in the next section.5
Model of Rate Structure Adoption -- model structure and specification
Rate structures are a discrete choice of a management technology adopted by districts in
the management of water. A model of rate structure choice by an irrigation district would
maximize the net benefits of farmers in the district. Such a model would however be quite
complex because it involves two divergent concepts of benefits: (1) farmers benefitting
individually from district water allocations and costs and (2) farmers benefitting collectively from
economically efficient and stable long term water allocations and costs.  How districts represent
their farm constituents and work out this balance is quite varied.  It is beyond the scope here to
fully develop a model of endogenous rate selection, but using simple production theory concepts
and indicators of opportunity costs, we can construct a series of hypotheses about factors which
would influence rate structure choice.
A major distinction between a district that charges a unit price versus a flat rate would  be
the amount of water each farmer would choose to have delivered. In a pure fixed flat fee
allocation, the cost to each farmer is the same and each farmer is allocated the same amount of
water per acre (w), regardless of the marginal production cost or value of that water. The
marginal price of water to the farmer is zero and has no connection to production cost or value. 
In this case there is no individual economic incentive to conserve and if there are no alternative
more highly valued uses (e.g. farmers have homogeneous production costs and no other water
allocation gains are possible) a district would be able to satisfy most rate structure criteria by
using a fixed flat fee rate structure.  District and production characteristics that may indicate these
conditions include (with many caveats), large water deliveries per acre (sufficient supply),  smaller
crop revenue per acre (low water value), and/or small diversity in crop production (limited
number of crops produced, low value associated with efficiency improvements). 
When there are uses of water valued greater than zero, the economically efficient
distribution of water would be: 
VMP (w) = P ; 1i w
where VMP is the value of the marginal product for farmer I, w is the optimal water application I i
by farmer I given his demand and  P ; is the price of water (presumably reflecting the marginal w
cost of supply). It is also evident that the costs in terms of reduced farm profits of a fixed supply6
without the possibility of trade increase with a greater disparity between a farmer’s demand for
water and the fixed allocation i.e.




0C/0P >  0 . w
In general, the probability that a district would not choose to allocate water on a fixed
average basis would be in part due to the costs that the fixed allocation imposes on its members.
In a district that is water short, marginal cost pricing may not limit demand to available supplies
(we will deal with this case separately).   Defining Prob as the probability that a district has a
variable (per unit or increasing rate structure elements) as opposed to a fixed price structure, we
have the following simplified hypotheses:
0Prob /0vmp > 0; k
0 Prob  /0w < 0; k
0 Prob  /0P >  0 . kw
Climatic variables obviously effect VMP of water (e.g. temperature and length of growing
season), thus we would also have
0Prob/0vmp 0vmp/0GDD > 0, 
where GDD is growing degree days for a district in a season, a factor is crop yield and diversity of
crops that can be grown.
The likelihood that farmers would want to internally trade water among themselves would
be a function of the diversity of water demand within the district. Given a diversity of crops and
farm practices, it seems evident that the following condition would result:
VMP (w) g VMP (w); 12
This creates the classic condition for trade but, for a variety of reasons, it may not be possible to7
set up a secondary internal market for trading (reallocating) water. A water allocation allowing
choice of water delivered (based on pricing) would increase total net benefits of farmer, i.e., 
VMP (w ) = VMP (w )= P ; 11 22 w
If we define the diversity of demand as the variance in value per acre within a district (S),
then this hypothesis follows:
0Prob/0S > 0.
Internal water marketing would serve as an alternative to pricing. State laws are a major
factor allowing internal trading, thus
0Prob/0ST  > 0 r 
where ST  is a state that does allow internal trading.  r 
In addition to individual farmer incentives, the district has collective objectives such as
repayment of fixed obligations, efficient delivery of water and sufficient total supply.   Per unit
pricing of water with variability in supply (deliveries) make these objectives more difficult to
achieve. A model of collective decisions is difficult, but obviously some observations from utility
literature would suggest the following:
0Prob/0FC > 0
0Prob/0 )  < 0, supplies
where increased variability in water supplies (deliveries) would be associated a fixed rate structure
to maintain revenue stability.  
We can assess these tendencies with a logit or probit formulation of district water pricing.
In general a binary choice model has the following form:
Prob (Y = 1) = F(B’x)
Prob (Y = 0) = 1 - F(B’x)8
where Y = 1 are districts with conservation oriented rate structures (uniform and increasing per
unit pricing elements) and where Y = 0 are districts with fixed fee rate structures.
For probit:
Prob (Y = 1) = 0 (B’x)
where the 0 is the cumulative normal distribution.
For logit, we have
Prob (Y=1) = ￿ (B’x)
where the ￿ is the cumulative logistic distribution.
The generalized form of the rate structure adoption probability model is:
Prob (Y) = f ( Num, Rev_AC, Cost, Water, STD, Acres, EFF, ALF, GDD, ST)
Variable definition and mean values.
Name Definition Mean
NUM Number of crops grown in the district (diversity measure) 3.93
REV-AC Farm revenue per irrigated acre in the district 719.4
COST Cost of district water delivery per acre foot 23.88
WATER 10 year average water deliveries per acre 2.98
DIFF Difference in revenue per acre between highest and lowest crop 1546
ACRES Irrigated acres in district 36850
EFF Efficiency, amount of water delivered as a percent of diverted .6995
STD Standard deviation of water deliveries .196
ALF Forage crops acres per total district acres .44
GDD Growing degree days – crop potential 1068
ST State dummy variable WA OR ID CA NV AZ CO UT WY TX NM SD ND NE
Irrigation District Data
An empirical data set of these variables was developed from unpublished survey’s of
district rate structures, water use and cropping patterns and from Census of Agriculture and9
National Climate Center data.  The data used in this study matches county and agricultural census
data with respective district level data. To obtain a comprehensive view of district rate structures,
an analysis of an unpublished survey of BOR irrigation districts was conducted (Negre et al.). The
survey provided a comprehensive enumeration is water rates;  rate design, and assessment
charges. Rate survey data were matched with district level data on costs, cropping patterns, water
usage.  Agricultural census and county data were also matched with the district rate survey to
ascertain crop patterns, growing degree days, revenues and cost of crops grown in the districts.
Results
Using the economic principles of rate design as a framework, measures of irrigation
district rate structure objectives and physical and economic conditions were developed. The
factors investigated or the binary choice independent variables, characterize the constraints under
which districts operate, value and cost of water, quantity of water delivered, and revenue risk for
districts. In the estimation of binary choice models justification of the use of the normal
distribution (probit) or logistic distribution (logit) is unresolved (Greene). We assumed a logit
model. The log likelihood function was estimated by an iterative procedure (LIMDEP). Rate
structure adoption was predicted with 75% accuracy. Both significant and non-significant factors
are key to understanding rate choice.  The statistical results and partial derivatives are shown in
Table 1 and Table 2. District’s were more likely to adopt conservation rate pricing when the cost
of water to farmers was greater, higher value crops were grown and in areas with warmer and
longer growing seasons. These conditions may be interpreted as reflecting the presence of greater
opportunity costs in allocating water between low and higher valued uses. Conservation rate
pricing was less likely to be adopted by district’s where the proportion of alfalfa to total acreage
was higher and with higher per acre deliveries of water. Somewhat surprisingly, annual variation
in water deliveries (which should increase the risk of revenue shortfalls) and size of the district
(larger districts being more sophisticated) have little bearing on the type of rate structure adopted. 
By examining the attributes of districts in relation to their multiple objectives and constraints,
assistance and recommendations in rate structure design can be targeted to those districts most
likely to adopt conservation pricing10
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Table 1 -- Rate Structure Adoption, Logit Model Statistical Results
Variable Partial Derivative Logit Coefficient  Standard Error Z           P       Mean 
12
NUM -4.33E-02 -0.2049 0.21112 -0.971 0.33178 3.945
REV_AC 5.01E-05 2.37E-04 3.53E-04 0.672 0.50134 723.2
DIFF -4.00E-05 -1.89E-04 1.72E-04 -1.099 0.27178 1556
ALF -0.3663 -1.7342 1.0366 -1.673 0.09433 0.4435
ACRES 1.13E-06 5.33E-06 5.14E-06 1.037 0.29958 3.70E+04
EFF -0.30071 -1.4237 1.0499 -1.356 0.17509 0.6991
COST 7.18E-03 3.40E-02 2.09E-02 1.624 0.10438 23.99
WATER -4.66E-02 -0.22078 0.15906 -1.388 0.16512 2.997
STD 0.26679 1.2631 1.6565 0.763 0.44576 0.1964
GDD 3.80E-04 1.80E-03 7.79E-04 2.309 0.02097 1068
WA 0.37097 1.7563 1.1596 1.515 0.12987 9.82E-02
OR 0.1919 0.90856 1.1632 0.781 0.43476 7.36E-02
ID 0.1185 0.56101 1.1801 0.475 0.63452 6.14E-02
CA 0.67638 3.2023 1.5623 2.05 0.04039 0.1288
AZ 4.45E-02 0.21054 1.8446 0.114 0.90913 6.14E-02
CO 0.58788 2.7833 1.3588 2.048 0.04053 6.14E-02
UT 0.38972 1.8451 1.1507 1.603 0.10883 0.1166
WY -3.57E-02 -0.16883 1.1589 -0.146 0.88418 7.36E-02
TX -0.18467 -0.87431 1.5145 -0.577 0.56374 3.68E-02
NM -1.77E-02 -8.37E-02 1.3346 -0.063 0.95001 4.91E-02
SD -4.67E-03 -2.21E-02 1.5669 -0.014 0.98874 1.84E-02
ND 3.69E-02 0.17465 1.2711 0.137 0.89071 4.91E-02
NE -6.90E-02 -0.32678 0.87174 -0.375 0.70776 0.1043
1/Partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of
characteristics computed at the means of the Xs. Observations used for means
are all observations.
2/Measures of fit    
Number of observations              163     
Log likelihood function       -80.74738     
Restricted log likelihood     -112.2918     
Chi-squared                    63.08890     
Degrees of freedom                   22     
Significance level            0.7712502E-05
3/Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes
            Predicted
Actual       0     1 TOTAL
  0         55    19    74
  1         19    70    89
TOTAL       74    89   163